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Abstract
The role of religion in politics has been rising to the forefront of history in the Middle
East for a number of decades and more so since 9/11, raising significant questions as to
whether religion functions as a catalyst for conflict or peace. This thesis focuses
specifically on the role of religion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the manner in
which actors incorporate religion into their national politics. In doing so, the inquiry
focuses on the proponents of religion on both the Jewish and the Palestinian sides in
addressing a) territorial rights, b) interpretations in the use of deadly force and violence,
and c) interpretations of the final political goal to be attained. In the context of the
broader nationalism of each side, the study reflects on different approaches to religion
and how they may provide perspectives that are either catalytic to conflict or catalytic to
building peace. In this light, the inquiry of this thesis analyzes and contrasts religious
nationalism and pro-peace religiosity, concluding with implications and directives for
conflict resolution.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Deciding on the Topic
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was my main focus throughout my graduate
career. My interest in the conflict started after my first journey to the Holy Land in a
program that was gifted as a birth right to people born of Jewish heritage. When I was
there, I immediately I felt that I was expected to take a side in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. I was filled with nothing short of blistering emotion, resulting in a crisis of
identity. I was drawn by this intrigue so much that the following summer I was lucky
enough to find an internship in Jerusalem at a small organization called Interfaith
Encounter Association. It facilitates dialogue between Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land.
During that time, much of my academic work focused on interethnic dialogue between
Jews and Palestinians, with a focus on religion.
Further on, I took courses that reflected my interests in the conflict. A few
significant courses taught by Harry Anastasiou titled Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict and
another titled Perspectives in Conflict Resolution gifted many significant takeaways,
providing a framework for analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Through my studies, it became clear that as a powerful identity reference,
nationalism is a significant element driving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover,
within the broader narratives of nationalism on the respective sides, religious nationalism,
which is the incorporation of religion into the nationalist narrative, also plays a key role,
as it adds moral legitimacy to nationalism and its associated presumption of the supreme
and sacred value of the nation-state.
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According to Juegensmeyer (1996), the role of religion in national politics has
been on the rise since the 1990s. The role of religion in the Middle East has moved
increasingly to the forefront of history since 9/11 and significant questions have been
raised regarding the role it plays in in promoting peace or conflict. Analysts of the three
monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam and Christianity, argue that these religions
historically promoted both conflict and peace, which makes them ambivalent. Barash and
Webel (2014) note that while all these religions reflect narrative and values of peace, they
also have become party to much conflicts throughout history. Hatred based on ethnic and
religious differences was at the root of many wars throughout history, including the
Crusades in the Middle Ages, (European Christians versus Arab Muslims), and the Thirty
Years’ War (Largely Catholics versus Protestants), which devastated Europe in the 17th
century (Barash & Webel, 2014, p.175). Throughout the Middle East in particular,
religion has become intertwined with the intensification of conflict and violence. This
trend is also reflected in aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This thesis will focus on the two main groups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
that have incorporated religion in their respective national identity and approach to the
conflict, namely, the Jewish Orthodox and religious Zionists on the Israeli side and
Hamas on the Palestinian side. The inquiry will also explore religious perspective on the
two sides that have developed perspectives beyond the nationalist frameworks that have
rendered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict protracted.
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1.2 Problem Statement
In light of the above, the inquiry of the thesis will explore the conditions under which
religion becomes a catalyst for conflict, including lethal conflict and the conditions under
which religion may become a catalyst for sustainable peace.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
The methodology followed in this thesis is qualitative content analysis, focusing
on scholars, political figures, religious leaders, the press and charters. This thesis will
begin with conflict analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to create a theoretical
framework of the interethnic relations in this region, subsequently focusing on the
religious dimension of the conflict. The qualitative methodology compares and contrasts
the content of relevant texts as they bear on the research question. In this context, it is
important to be sensitive to what this conflict means to the populations involved,
particularly for the groups that carry a religious narrative.
The literature I chose to review derive from the religious ideology of Hamas and
the religious perspective of Orthodox Jews and religious Zionists. This included the
examination of Palestinian Sunni-Islam, their narrative, how their religious ideology
connects to nationalism and on how they incorporate their fundamentalism into their
approach to the conflict, including the use of violence. More specifically, the research
will examine their view of Islam and how they incorporate their religion into their politics
in the context of the Palestinian experience. I conducted research on the aforementioned
dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to allow readers to broaden their
understanding when answering similar questions in their own studies, in an attempt to
make sense of a foreign occupation and daily life within the Hamas controlled regions. In
this light, I have included perspectives of the conflict through the lens of some of Hamas’
most influential scholars and poets, including Mohamed Ikbal and al-Bukhari. I would
also like to note the difficulties of paraphrasing that arose when examining the Hamas
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ideology. I felt that paraphrasing more could diminish Hamas’s message to the reader.
For this reason I presorted to several direct quotes.
Furthermore, including in the inquiry the works of critical scholars and poets is
imperative as this would give a range of interpretations of Islamic tradition and its
bearing on peace and violence. The research will subsequently focus on the Jewish
Orthodox and religious Zionists and their religious ideology. This will include their
narrative and how they incorporate religion into their politics and nationalism.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
Understanding the role of religion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires an
understanding of the broader ethnocentric nationalist conflict between the two sides. The
latter provides the context for researching the various ways in which adherents of the
Jewish and Muslim religions respectively approach the function of their religion in the
conflict. It must further be noted that while nationalism and its ethnocentric approach to
statehood is a central driver in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nationalism is
not unique to either the Israeli or the Palestinian side, as nationalism is a master narrative
that scholars associate with the historical development of modernity and the advent of
nation-states (Alter, 1994; Anastasiou, 2008; Anderson, 1995; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm,
1990). For this reason it is necessary to review the literature on the basic characteristics
of nationalism as a stepping stone to focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
function of religion within it.
The two-volume Encyclopedia of Identity, the most up-to-date compendium of
scholarly work on the topic, profiles nationalism as one of the central references of
identity. The Encyclopedia makes references to a broad range of identity references, from
class, to race, to gender, etc. However, as a modernist narrative of identity formation,
nationalism has a prominent role in conflict through its association with the nation-state.
Be it in the secular or religious visions nationalism, is viewed by scholars as one of the
most powerful forces in the modern world. So what are the key characteristics of this
powerful narrative?
The notion of nationalism is ingrained in the everyday lives of citizens of modern
nation-states. The pride people feel for national accomplishments, the articulations by
6

politicians of the “national interests” in justifying policies, and the symbols that nations
use for self-identification (e.g., flags, national anthems, and monuments) are prevalent
references of nationalism as a collective identity, and help create a national consciousness
among disparate individuals. While nationalism was essential to the structure of modern
nation-states and can play and imperative role when societies face times of crises, it can
also lead people and their leaders to view their nation as inerrant and beyond reproach,
justifying the use of force and violence to deal with real perceived adversaries
(Anastasiou and Broome, 2010).
Scholarly interest in the concept of nationalism amplified significantly during the
1980s and has continued to the present-day. Earlier studies focused on European
nationalism as the driving force leading to the two world wars, but lately there has been
more emphasis on non-western examples, specifically in Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East. In the classical form of nationalism, which is implicated in the creation and
conservation of sovereign states, loyalty to the nation takes precedence over all other
loyalties, such as regional, local, or kinship ties. Contrary to classical nationalism, postnationalist states are more likely to raise individual rights, ingenuity, and diversity of
communities within the nation as fundamental to democracy (Anastasiou and Broome,
2010).
In nationalism, the idea of the nation has a mastery over people that is perhaps
best understood as an outgrowth of the exaggerated characteristics that the nationalist
mind projects and bestows on the nation-state. Regardless of whether they see
nationalism as a positive or negative force, scholars usually concede that in nationalism
the nation is positioned on the highest pedestal, and viewed as the supreme agency of
7

significance, collective identity, and moral justification. Eric Hobsbawn critically noted
that one of the powerful ways in which nationalism becomes historically substantiated is
through its presumption that the nation is sacred. Anthony Smith, a proponent of
nationalism, similarly speaks of the nation as being a religion surrogate. This declaration
can be applied both to nationalisms that have embodied traditional religion as part of their
mental structure of values (e.g., Serbian, Greek, Hindu, Islamic, Irish Protestant and Irish
Catholic nationalisms) as well as to secular nationalisms that aimed to abolish traditional
religion from their values structures of national identity (e.g., Turkish, French, Egyptian,
and Syrian nationalisms) (Anastasiou and Broome, 2010).
In regard to the nationalist approach to history, the attribution of sacredness to the
idea of the nation has been ritualized in representations of national leaders, in ethnocentric public ceremonies, and in master narratives of national valiant acts that focus on
extraordinary achievements, highlighted by revolutions and wars and stories of heroic
acts. These nationalist narratives of history integrate selected historical facts into myths
of national glory, greatness, binding destiny and greatness, and even divine election.
Through an exaggerated notion of the nation, nationalist historiography protrudes a
glorified image of the nation, placing it into a superlative, primal past, transformed by
necessity into a convincing duty-bound present, and an infinite, grandiose future
(Anastasiou and Broome, 2010).
In all these ways, nationalism develops a mono-centric, narcissistic concept of the
nation’s life-world, designing an image of a nation’s history identifying the “good” with
one’s own nation and the “bad” with that of the “other,” specifically of “the enemy
other.” But according to Anastasiou and Broom (2010),
8

The most problematic aspect of nationalism at both the national and
international levels has been its capacity to link moral reasoning and the
use of force/violence, especially in time of conflict. In a unique manner,
nationalism has historically grounded the right to use force/violence in the
moral rationale that the nation is the ultimate collective value and the
imperative basis for community, identity, security and well-being. This
configuration of belief and action has made nationalism a strong
legitimizer of the use of force and violence throughout modern and much
of post-modern history. The most prominent symbols of nationalism,
ranging from national anthems, national flags, monuments and
historiographies, disclose symbols and involve narratives of war,
revolution, heroics, and the shedding of blood as supreme references of
national identity, glory, and honor (Vol. II, p. 500).
Nationalism operates with the assumption that the structure of identity is
exclusively and fundamentally mono-ethnic and one-dimensional. Ignatieff (1999), a
renowned scholar of ethnocentric nationalism, explains that: “As a cultural ideal,
nationalism is the claim that while men and women have many identities, it is the nation
that provides them with their primary form of belonging” (p. 5). Ignatieff further notes
that nationalism is the most powerful mobilizer and legitimizer of deadly violence and
use of deadly force. He also asserts that unlike other references of identity and belonging,
such as family or profession, nationalism provides a narrative that can readily resort to
justifications for violence. He notes that it is not obvious “why national identity should be
a more important element of personal identity than any other; nor is it obvious why
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defense of the nation justifies the use of violence” (p. 6). The implication is that unlike
other aspects of identity, nationalism interprets national identity as supreme and sacred,
and thus worthy of human sacrifice.
In looking at the wars and violence that have engulfed the Middle East in the
post-9/11 era, as the broader context of the unfolding Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one
observes the intensification of competing nationalisms within as well as between
societies. The relapse of nationalism in the region and more specifically the rise of
religious nationalism and militancy, have posed new challenges especially in
confrontation with, and at times in alliance with militant transnational jihadism.
When specifically talking about the Israel-Palestine conflict, identity conflicts revolve
around the national identity configurations of the groups involved. Scholarly work by
Rothman (2001) asserts the idea that identity-based conflicts contain primary elements
that are based on mutual rejections of the legitimacy of the other side out of fear that such
recognition will undermine one’s own legitimacy, values, and claims. Rothman (2001)
continues by saying that in the not so distant past, Israelis feared that If Palestinian claims
were legitimate or taken seriously, they would undermine Israeli claims. Palestinians had
the same fears about the Israelis. Thus, the situation and concession over resources and
territory were viewed as zero-sum, primarily because of fears and mutual suspicion
regarding identity recognition.
Auerbach (2011), adds that the Israel-Palestine conflict is also a conflict over real
material assets, such as territory, water, border, security and the like. In connection to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict being a conflict over identity, Auerbach also adds that this
conflict is one in which each side sees the national identity of the other side as a threat,
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or, as translating this identity into the political sphere-that is, into a “nation-state” –as a
danger to its independent national identity. Auerbach continues by saying that the one
side therefore rejects the definition if the other side as a nation or, at a minimum, denies
its right to realize this identity in the context of national statehood. The Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is, in essence, a conflict over identity because its origin and the cause of its
continuation are rooted in each side’s denial of the nationhood of the other side, and each
side’s claim to the right to establish its own ethnocentric nation-state (p. 100).
More specific to the present inquiry, the role and function of religion is
contextualized within the abovementioned framework of Israeli-Palestinian nationalist
conflict, so naturally religion of the two sides assumes a certain relationship to
nationalism. One of the important scholars that addresses the relationship between
religion and nationalism is Juergensmeyer (1996). In his work The Worldwide Rise of
Religious Nationalism, focuses on the ascendancy of religious nationalism around the
world and especially in the Middle East and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a trend that
scholars agree has intensified during the post-9/11 era. . Juergensmeyer indicates that
there are two main kinds of religious nationalists: ethnic and ideological. Ethnic religious
nationalists attack rival ethnicities, while ideological religious nationalists attack the
secularity within their own country (government and supporters) or rival religions. He
further states that, “If the ethnic approach to religious nationalism politicizes religion by
employing religious identities for political ends, an ideological approach to religious
nationalism does the opposite: it religionizes politics.” This topic is essential as it notes
the two basic ways in which religion becomes integrated into national politics, and
national identity formations.
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In light of all of the above, we can now turn specifically to the role of religion in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its relationship to nationalism as a vital reference of
identity. For the analysis that follows we will draw from several sources the most notable
of which are the Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, often referred to as the
Hamas Charter, the Encyclopedia Judaica, and the Likud Party Platform, which presents
the political position of the Likud party, which also incorporated elements of religious
nationalism. The Hamas charter in its original version is in Arabic. However a number of
scholars have translated the charter into many languages, including English. The Avalon
Project of Yale Law School (1988) translated the Hamas charter into English, from which
the subsequent analysis will draw in determining how religion functions in Hamas’s
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Moreover, in the analysis that follows we will also focus on authors and religious
leaders from the two sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, who approach religion as a
framework of values that promotes peace across conflict lines. Rabbi Michael Learner,
Jacques Derrida, Dr. Alon Goshen-Gottstein, Sheikh Imad Al-Falouji, Abdul Hadi Plazzi,
are some of the relevant names that see religion as a catalyst for peace, to which we will
turn in the latter part of our subsequent analysis.
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Chapter 4: Analysis
4.1 Religious Migration and Rising Trends
The religious ideologies in both Hamas and the Jewish Orthodox are a key
element in how they view their politics in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Though
it has been frequently asserted that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about two peoples
fighting over the same piece of land, it has also been considered as a religious and
national geopolitical conflict. Before the establishment of Israel in 1948, in the 1920’ and
30’s Mohammad Amin al-Hussayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, attempted to prevent
Jews from buying Arab land by persuading Arabs to donate their land to an Islamic holy
trust, known as a waqf, an endowment made by a Muslim for a religious, educational, and
charitable cause, where the land would be withdrawn from purchase by Jews. Without a
known authority for its truth, Al-Hussayni spread word that Jews were going to take over
the Temple Mount and Haram al Sharif and that stirred up animosity within the Arabs.
This was one of the leading causes of the riots of 1929, where Jews were attacked in
Hebron, Safed and Tel Aviv.
But religion played a relatively minor role before it toughened magnanimously
after the 1967 war. It would be false to say religion was completely absent from the
conflict because a small number of Jews moved to Palestine for religious reasons.
However, religious morale strengthened greatly after 1967 due to Israel’s military
victories over its Arab enemies. Religious Jews began to believe that their victories were
a sign from God that the Messiah was on His way. They believed their victory was a sign
from above to redouble their efforts in settling all the land that was part of ancient Israel,
from the Mediterranean to the Jordan. Numerous religious Jews known as right-wing
13

religious-Zionists found their expression during the formation Gush Emunim- an Israeli,
right-wing activist movement committed to establishing Jewish settlements in the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. Gush Emunim sprang out of the conquests
of the 1967 Six-Day War, encouraging Jewish settlement of the land based on the belief
that, according to the Torah, God gave it to the Jewish people” (Encyclopedia Judaica:
Volume 8, p. 145). Gush Emunim no longer exists officially, but footprints of its
influence remain in Israeli society.
The 1967 war sent shockwaves through the Arab world because the Arabs were
defeated and the Palestinians were forced out of their homes, with no merit of return.
Palestinians realized they could no longer rely on what was then the Arab League, and
eventually turned to the Palestinian Leadership Organization (PLO), a secular nationalist
organization established in 1964. Originally, the Palestinian people placed all their hopes
on the PLO in their attempt to reclaim their land. But gradually they began to lose hope
while Israeli settlers built more settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. The number of
settlers grew rapidly over the years, from fewer than 1200 settlers in the West Bank in
1972, to over 44,000 by 1985. In the eyes of the Palestinian people, the PLO became
ineffective and they gradually stated to seek stronger leadership. The Palestinians then
set out in search of a new movement that addressed their need to regain what they viewed
as their rightful homeland. They thus turned to political Islam.
In the form of religious nationalism political Islam exploded to the forefront of
history with the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran
following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. The establishment of the Islamic Republic
of Iran grounded a Shi’a Muslim nationalism galvanized religious Muslims throughout
14

the region, including an overwhelming number of Palestinians despite the fact that they
were Sunni Muslims. Commenting of the impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982, Augustus Richard Norton wrote the following in his book, Hezbollah (p.33):
Even if Israel had not launched its invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982,
the young would-be revolutionaries among the Shi'a would have pursued
their path of emulating Iran's Islamic revolution. Undoubtedly, however,
the invasion pushed the Shi'a further in this direction, creating conditions
for the establishment and flourishing of Hezbollah.
The former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barack put the matter succinctly in July
2006: "When we entered Lebanon. . . there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with
perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi'a in the south. It was our presence there that created
Hezbollah" (Newsweek, July 18, 2006). This statement strongly suggests that deadly
conflict in the region contributed to the rise of militant religious nationalism among the
Arabs.
Hezbollah (a Shiite group whose Arabic name translates to “The Party of God”)
was formed in Lebanon in 1982 and the mid 1980’s. It was inspired by the prolonged
Israeli invasion in 1982 and the rise of the Iranian Islamic Republic. Between the years of
1985 and 1986, the formation of Islamic Jihad and also Hamas took place. Founded in
1988, Hamas (which stands for the Arabic acronym “The Islamic Resistance Movement”)
was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and grew as a result of the Iranian
Revolution, but mostly in response to the oppressive Israeli occupation and Jewish settler
violence in the West Bank. Hamas steadily grew and won the Palestinian elections in
2006. There are several factors that attributed to Hamas’s victory:
15

(1) The PLO was too weak and ineffective in alleviating the oppression of the
Israeli occupation and failed to make any effort to stop the growth of settlements. By
2006, the number of settlers in the West Bank had grown over 260,000. Counter to the
PLO, Hamas was seen as a force against the settlers and as having influenced the Israeli
decision the pull out of Gaza in 2005.
(2) The Palestinian Authority created a negative reputation for itself due to
corruption and cronyism and at the same time, as opposed to Hamas that developed a
reputation of honesty and integrity.
(3) Hamas also built a foundation of benevolence amongst the Palestinian people
by operating social programs such as mosques, school, soup kitchens and clinics.
By the time Hamas and right-wing religious Zionism were fully present on the
Palestinian and Israeli sides respectively, the recourse to violence was seen by both sides
as morally justified.
At present, the Jewish state of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, are populated by
leaders who believe that God endorses their national agenda, that God has given them all
the land of the region, and that God wills that they secure the land and their statehood
through all means including deadly force and violence. Such assumptions in the
respective nationalist narratives made it easier to dehumanize the “other” and justify
killings.
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4.2 The Role of Religion on the Palestinian Side: Profile of Hamas’s Ideology
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (CIRM) of 1988, often called
the Hamas Charter, is one of the most demonstrative declarations that illustrate how
Hamas incorporates religion into its politics. Researchers refer to Hamas’s CIRM as
defining its ideology. Starting with Article One of the CIRM, we observe that the
movement's program is Islam. From the articles of the charter, it draws its ideas, its ways
of judgment and interpretation of the universe, life and man. Hamas resorts to its charter
for motivation and for admonition of its steps.
For Hamas’s followers and believers, the CIRM is the foundation of how to live
their everyday life and how to think of the world around them. In other words, the CIRM
presents Hamas and its followers with a distinctive belief system, in contrast to belief
systems outside of Islam. In addition, Article Six quotes the Muslim poet, Mohamed
Ikbal, who declares that "If faith is lost, there is no security and there is no life for him
who does not adhere to religion. He who accepts life without religion, has taken
annihilation as his companion for life” (Avalon Project, 1988). According to Wheatcroft,
Ikbal also believed that Islam is far from being a religion of private conscience and
practice. Rather it is accompanied by a social order and legal concepts (2002).
As translated by The Avalon Project (1988) of the Yale Law School, the CIRM
states that in pursuing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, Hamas
asserts that “Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Qur’an its constitution”. As
will become evident in the following section, the CIRM contains quotes from the Quran,
Islamic scholars and Islamic poets. In analyzing the CIRM, we will select the particular
articles that articulate the role of religion in addressing a) territorial rights, b)
17

interpretations in the use of deadly force and violence, and c) interpretation of the final
political goal.

4.2.1 The Role of Religion in Determining Territorial Rights
In Article Eleven, the CIRM states that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf, a
type of sacred Islamic trust. As such, no part of this land can be sold or traded to anyone.
It is land reserved for Muslims and negotiating it away would break trust with Allah. In
its essence, the land, according to Hamas, is consecrated for future Muslim generations
until Judgement Day. Article Eleven also insists that the land cannot be possessed, not
even by Arabs. According to Article nine, Muslims are to fight,
against the false, defeating it and vanquishing it so that justice could
prevail, homelands be retrieved and from its mosques would the voice of
the mu'azen (an announcer of daily prayers) emerge declaring the
establishment of the state of Islam, so that people and things would return
each to their right places and Allah is our helper. (Avalon, 1988)
In addition, Article Fourteen states that:
The question of the liberation of Palestine is bound to three circles: The
Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle. Each of these
circles has its role in the struggle against Zionism. Each has its duties, and
it is a horrible mistake and a sign of deep ignorance to overlook any of
these circles. Palestine is an Islamic land which has the first of the two
kiblahs (direction to which Muslims turn in praying), the third of the holy

18

(Islamic) sanctuaries, and the point of departure for Mohamed's midnight
journey to the seven heavens (i.e. Jerusalem). (Avalon, 1988)
As it is evident form the abovementioned quotes, Hamas believes that the
Muslim religion bids them to the land of Palestine in a non-negotiable manner.
Repossessing the land that was lost is equated with the will of Allah, who is
believed to have granted the land as an inheritance to Muslims until the Day of
Judgement.

4.2.2 Religious Interpretations in the Use of Deadly Force and Violence
The CIRM is premised on Muslims who have given their allegiance to Allah
whom they truly worship. Article Three quotes Allah stating that, "I have created the jinn
(an intelligent spirit of lower rank than the angels, able to appear in human and animal
forms and to possess humans) and humans only for the purpose of worshipping". In this
light, the primary responsibility of Muslims is to know the duty toward themselves, their
family and their country, fear Allah and raise the banner of Jihad in the face of the
oppressors, so that they would rid the land and the people of their uncleanliness, vileness
and evils (Avalon, 1988).
Moreover, Article Seven includes a passage written by Islamic scholar, alBukhari. It states that:
The Day of Judgement will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews,
when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will
say Oh Muslims, Oh Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill
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him. Only the Gharkad tree, would not do that because it is one of the
trees of the Jews (Avalon Project, 1988).
Furthermore, the CIRM adheres to the fulfillment of Allah's promise, no matter how long
that should take. Salvation will be delivered. According to Yahya (1994), Allah’s
promise to His believers is great bounties in both this life and the Hereafter, and people
may hope to obtain them according to the degree of their faith and in closeness to Allah,
as well as their submission and sincerity.
Additionally, Article Eight states the slogan of the CIRM, “Jihad is its path and
death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes”. Furthermore, Article Thirteen
states that initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are
in contradiction to the principles of the CIRM. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse
directed against the Muslim religion. The nationalism of the CIRM is grounded in
religion, and Hamas’s members are raised on this narrative. For the sake of hoisting the
banner of Allah over their homeland they fight (Avalon, 1988).
The CIRM also states that there is no solution for the Palestinian question except
through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time
and vain endeavors. The charter asserts that the Palestinian people know better than to
consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with. Article Thirteen also makes
reference to an ally of the struggle, mainly Syria, it quotes from the Hadith, which states
that:
The people of Syria are Allah's last in His land. He wreaks His vengeance
through them against whomsoever He wishes among His slaves. It is
unthinkable that those who are double-faced among them should prosper
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over the faithful. They will certainly die out of grief and desperation.
(Avalon, 1988)
Also, Article Fifteen states that on the day that enemies usurp part of Muslim
land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Muslim. In face of the Jews’ usurpation
of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised. To do this requires the
diffusion of Islamic consciousness among the masses, both on the regional, Arab and
Islamic levels. It is necessary to instill the spirit of Jihad in the heart of the nation so that
they would confront the enemies and join the ranks of the fighters. Article Fifteen ends
with a quote from Islamic scholar, al-Bukhari:
The bond of one day for the sake of Allah is better than the world and
whatever there is on it. The place of one's whip in Paradise is far better
than the world and whatever there is on it. A worshipper's going and
coming in the service of Allah is better than the world and whatever there
is on it. (Avalon, 1988)
Al-Bukari also stated that, “I swear by the holder of Mohammed's soul that I
would like to invade and be killed for the sake of Allah, then invade and be killed, and
then invade again and be killed”.
Furthermore, in Article Seventeen, the CIRM states that:
Organizations such as information campaigns, films, and the school
curriculum, using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through
Zionist organizations under various names and shapes, such as
Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, espionage groups and others, operate in the
absence of Islam and its estrangement among its people. The Islamic
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peoples should perform their role in confronting the conspiracies of these
saboteurs. The day Islam is in control of guiding the affairs of life, these
organizations, hostile to humanity and Islam, will be obliterated. (Avalon,
1988)
In Article Thirty-Two, the CIRM states that, for “The Islamic Resistance
Movement, leaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he
who does that.” What follows from this is a quote from the Quran, stating that, “For who
shall turn his back unto them on that day, unless he turneth aside to fight, or retreated to
another party of the faithful, shall draw on himself the indignation of Allah, and his
abode shall be hell; an ill journey shall it be thither”. The CIRM also asserts that there is
no way out except by concentrating all powers and energies to face what they see as the
vicious invasion of their land by the enemy. The alternative is loss of one's country, the
dispersion of citizens, the spread of vice on earth, and the destruction of religious values.
According to the CIRM, the fight for Palestine is a fight for humanity (Avalon, 1988).

4.2.3 Religious Interpretation of the Final Political Goal
Regarding the final end and vision of the national homeland, Article Twelve states that:
Nationalism, from the point of view of the CIRM, is part of the religious
creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the
case when an enemy should tread Muslim land. Resisting and quelling the
enemy become the individual duty of every Muslim, male or female. A
woman can go out to fight the enemy without her husband's permission,
and so does the slave: without his master's permission. Nothing of the sort
is to be found in any other regime. This is an undisputed fact. If other
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nationalist movements are connected with materialistic, human or regional
causes, nationalism of the CIRM has all these elements as well as the more
important elements that give it soul and life. It is connected to the source
of spirit and the granter of life, hoisting in the sky of the homeland the
heavenly banner that joins earth and heaven with a strong bond.
Article Twelve continues with a quote from the Quran saying:
Now is the right direction manifestly distinguished from deceit: whoever
therefore shall deny Tagut (to cross the limits, overstep boundaries, or to
rebel), and believe in Allah, he shall surely take hold with a strong handle,
which shall not be broken; Allah is he who heareth and seeth. (Avalon,
1988)
Similarly, Article Twenty-Eight states that:
We (Muslims) should not forget to remind every Muslim that when the
Jews conquered the Holy City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the
Aqsa Mosque and proclaimed that "Mohammed is dead, and his
descendants are all women. Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and
the Muslim people.
The CIRM ends the article with a quote, "May the cowards never sleep” (Avalon,1988).
In Article Thirty-Four, the CIRM quotes the Quran anticipating a decisive final victory:
“Say unto those who believe not, Ye shall be overcome, and thrown together into hell; an
unhappy couch it shall be”.
The article further asserts:
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This is the only way to liberate Palestine. There is no doubt about the
testimony of history. It is one of the laws of the universe and one of the
rules of existence. Nothing can overcome iron except iron. Their false
futile creed can only be defeated by the righteous Islamic creed. A creed
could not be fought except by a creed, and in the last analysis, victory is
for the just, for justice is certainly victorious. (Avalon Project, 1988).
In light of the above analysis it becomes evident how the Islamic Resistance
Movement uses many passages of the Quran and the Hadith and morphs them into the
movement’s religious nationalist ideology as the foundation of what they perceive as the
struggle for the liberation and establishment of the Palestinian state. It is also evident that
Hamas’s religious nationalism sees the establishment of a free Palestinian state and as an
Islamic Palestinian state.

4.3 The Role of Religion on the Israeli Side: Profile of Religious Zionist Ideology
The Jewish Orthodox faction is considered to be the religious fundamentalist
group on the Israeli side of the region. Within the Jewish Orthodox, there are what are
called Zionists. Zionism does not have a uniform ideology, but has evolved through
dialogue among a plethora of ideologies, one being religious Zionism. Before the
establishment of the State of Israel, religious Zionists were mainly observant Jews (Jews
who abide or adhere to the laws and duties of the Torah) who supported Zionist efforts to
build a Jewish state in Palestine, or the Land of Israel. According to Rotberg (2007),
these goals centered first on the establishment of a Jewish state in 1948 in the ancient
homeland of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel). Historical, theological, national, existential,
24

political, societal and cultural arguments were used to justify those goals. In analyzing
these goals, we will select particular articles and literature that articulate the role of
religion in addressing a) territorial rights, b) interpretations in the use of deadly force and
violence, and c) interpretation of the final political goal.

4.3.1 The Role of Religion in Determining Territorial Rights
Israelis and Palestinians have had many issue that divide them. One of the most
significant issues is territory, as this is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The issue
of territories is so important that international bodies have addressed it. The international
community considers Israeli settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories illegal under
international law, because of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) of 1949 (a treaty
that defines humanitarian protections and prohibits countries from moving population
into territories occupied in a conflict). Along with the GCIV, many other international
organizations, such as The United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General
Assembly, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Court of
Justice and the High Contracting Parties have affirmed that the GCIV does apply. And
yet, in the eyes of religious nationalists, religious interpretations transcend international
law.
Views from the religious Zionist perspective play an important part in
approaching territorial rights in the region, especially by political Zionist figures. A case
in point is Meir David Kahane, an American-Israeli Orthodox rabbi, ultra-Nationalist
politician, teacher, and writer. His work became either the direct or indirect foundation of
most modern Jewish militant and far right-wing political groups. Kahane was also an
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ordained Orthodox rabbi, who also served as a member of the Israeli Knesset. A
significant part of Kahane’s ideology was that, Israel should never start a war for
territory, but if a war were launched against Israel, Biblical territory should be annexed.
Kahane also defined Biblical territory as the southern boundary reaching El Arish (the
largest city on the Sinai Peninsula), which takes in all of northern Sinai (Juergensmeyer,
1996).
To the east, the frontier runs along the western part of the East Bank of the Jordan
River, hence part of what is now Jordan. Eretz Israel (land of Israel) also includes part of
Lebanon and certain parts of Syria, and part of Iraq, all the way to the Tigris River.
Kahane also stated that, “Miracles don’t just happen”. He felt that the only way for the
Messiah to return is when the Jews create the right political conditions. Kahane, in fact
said that, “Miracles are made” (Juergensmeyer, 1996).
Another case in point is the interview of Education Minister Naftali Bennett on Al
Jazeera’s UpFront. In the interview, Bennett cites the Bible as the basis of the Jewish
claim to the occupied territories saying, “You need to change the narrative because it is
all there”. Bennett continued his statement by saying that there was never a Palestinian
state, so you cannot occupy something that was never a state. Bennett also claimed that
no Palestinian has ever been evicted from their home, except for those in “illegal
buildings”. “Give me the name of one Palestinian who was living in a home and had his
home taken away from him,” he said, before adding: “In Israel, if you build illegally, you
take your home away”. Bennett went on to say that Israel is doing a great job “hosting”
its Palestinian population. “We host within our country millions of Arabs…that enjoy full
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citizenship. But it is a Jewish and democratic country,” he said (“Israel’s Education”,
2017).
A look at the Likud Party (LP) the current governing party of Israel, also provides
a perspective on the religious interpretation of territorial rights. The LP was founded in
1973 by secular Zionists embracing right-wing politics. But it is important to note that the
party was also highly influenced by religious nationalists, partly because, they too,
embrace right-wing politics. On the issue of territory, the Likud Party Platform (LPP)
written in 1977 states the following:
The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal and
indisputable and is linked with the right to security and peace; therefore,
Judea and Samaria will not be handed to any foreign administration;
between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty.
(“Original Party”, n.d.)
According to the religious Zionist perspective God entrusted the land (Biblical
land) to the Jewish people and that there had never been a Palestinian state. Instead,
Palestinians are viewed as living on land that is not theirs. The aspiration of religious
nationalist is to achieve the establishment of “Greater Israel.” Their religious
interpretation requires the expansion of the current borders of Israel further and further.
During the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, Rabbi Yehuda Glick who is a
member of the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament), compared Trump to Cyrus the Great, the
biblical king who issued an edict for the building of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. “I
believe we’re living in a biblical era”. Glick explained. “I believe that if he became
president, then God wants him to be president” (“In Donald Trump”, 2017).
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Glick continued to say that, “If God wanted him to be president, then we can only
hope that he chooses to do the right things”. Glick believes that with Trump in the White
House, Israel will no longer be forced to agree to a two-state solution to the PalestinianIsraeli conflict, the position that U.S. administrations have championed since the
beginning of the conflict. Religious nationalists such as Glick and many settlers want to
drastically expand the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank despite
fierce opposition from the Palestinians and much of the international community.
Eventually, they want to see Israel annex those areas (“In Donald Trump”, 2017).

4.3.2 Religious Interpretations in the Use of Deadly Force and Violence
The use of violence and lethal force in Israel and Palestine has grown as a
consequence of repeated violent clashes and wars, of which the Gaza wars of 2008, 2012
and 2014 are the most recent cases. In this section of the analysis, the religious Zionist
perspective on the use of force will be examined. The recourse to the use of deadly force
by state of Israel is carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), one of the most
modern and powerful armies in the region. The IDF was originally build by the secular
and democratic Israeli regime. Through the years, with the rising influence of religious
nationalism, there was a process of religionization of the IDF. Questions among Israeli
leaders and citizens were subsequently raised as to whether religion was a unifying or a
divisive factor within the military. According to Israeli author, Ze’ev Drory (n.d.), at the
beginning of the Zionist movement, the approach was to shelter under the wings of the
IDF every Jew around the world, including religious Jews. It believed its duty was to let
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religious Jews identify with and feel part of that community, with the basic morals shared
by all Jews.
However, in recent years, there has been a growing number of religious Jews who
have joined the IDF, such that, the most significant change that the IDF has experienced
is the functioning of religion within its institutional culture. Drory (n.d.) asserts that
leaders of the national religious sector have inserted themselves into the military as key
players. Their religious leadership has now superseded secular commanders, moving to
higher and more powerful positions of rank. The louder their voices will become, the
bigger the impact religion makes on the IDF. This is a strong implication that the IDF
serves as an accomplice to religious influences in its use of force and violence in the
Israel-Palestine conflict.
Comparatively, on February 1994, the day of the second Muslim Sabbath during
Islam's holy month of Ramadan, Zionist settler, Baruch Goldstein, from the orthodox
settlement of Qiryat Arba entered the crowded Ibrahim (Abraham's) Mosque, located in
the biblical town of Hebron in the West Bank with the intention of killing Palestinians.
He emptied three thirty-round magazines with his automatic Glilon assault rifle into the
congregation of 800 Palestinian Muslim worshippers, killing 29 and wounding 150,
before being beaten to death. This event was known as the “Cave of the Patriarchs
Massacre”. Goldstein was a longstanding follower of the abovementioned, radical Jewish
fundamentalist group, and was motivated by a complex mixture of seemingly indivisible
political and religious necessity, fueled by zealotry and a grave sense of betrayal.
Goldstein stated that his prime minister (Rabin) was, "leading the Jewish state out of its
God-given patrimony and into mortal danger” (Juergensmeyer, 1996).
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In the opinion of Swedish scholar, Ranstorp (1996), both the location and the
timing of the Hebron massacre overlapped religious holidays of both Jewish Purim and
Muslim Ramadan. A large segment of militant and orthodox Jewish settlers in West Bank
and Gaza settlements portrayed Goldstein as a righteous man and hailed him as a martyr.
During his funeral, these orthodox settlers also voiced religious fervor in
uncompromising and militant terms, directed not only against the Arabs, but also against
the Israeli government, which they believed had betrayed the Jewish people and the
Jewish state. Ranstorp (1996) also claimed that:
Israeli leaders and the mainstream Jewish community tried to deny or
ignore the danger of Jewish extremism by dismissing Goldstein as, at
most, belonging to "the fringe of a fringe" within Israeli society. Any
doubts of the mortal dangers of religious zealotry from within were
abruptly silenced with one of the most outstanding events that discloses
the religious nationalist events on the Israeli side- the assassination of
prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.
The assassination of Rabin was a significant high point of religious nationalism.
The rise of religious nationalism emerged from a common experience of disaffection over
the dominance of modern Western culture, that seems to run parallel to Israeli secular
nationalism. Rabin’s assassination is a prime example. Rabin was assassinated by a
young Jewish theological student, Yigal Amir, who claimed he had acted on orders of
God. He declared: “Everything I did, I did it for the glory of God” (Juergensmeyer,
1996). Amir claimed he was at peace and that he felt normal. Amir argued that the
murder of Rabin was commendable, according to certain readings of religious law. One
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of those laws, he claimed, allowed to defend against those who could destroy a nation.
Amir had been influenced by militant rabbis and their halakhic (body of religious Jewish
laws derived from the Torah) rulings, which he interpreted to mean that the "pursuer's
decree" was to be applied against Israel's leader. Most Israelis may be astonished by the
notion of a Jew killing another Jew, but Rabin was ultimately the victim of a broader
force which has become one of the most vibrant, dangerous and pervasive trends in
religiously motivated terrorism, as claimed by Ranstorp (1996).

4.3.3 The Role of Religion in Interpreting the Final Political Goal
The final goal of religious nationalists on the Israeli side is the establishment and
sustenance of a Jewish state as a theocracy with extended borders. As previously
mentioned, the LP consists of secular and religious Zionists, both of which embrace
right-wing politics. The LPP includes a few clues of how they envision the boundaries of
their Holy Land. For example, in a statement where the LPP is objecting to any plan that
reduces the boundaries of their envisioned Holy Land, states the following:
A plan which relinquishes parts of western Eretz Israel, undermines our
right to the country, unavoidably leads to the establishment of a
"Palestinian State," jeopardizes the security of the Jewish population,
endangers the existence of the State of Israel and frustrates any prospect of
peace (“Original Party”, n.d., para. 1).
Focusing on settlements in the West Bank, the LPP also states that:
Settlement, both urban and rural in all parts of the Land of Israel is the
focal point of the Zionist effort to redeem the country, to maintain vital
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security areas and serves as a reservoir of strength and inspiration for the
renewal of the pioneering spirit. The Likud government will call on the
younger generation in Israel and the dispersions to settle and help every
group and individual in the task of inhabiting and cultivating the
wasteland, while taking care not to dispossess anyone. (“Original Party”,
n.d., para. 3)
Another significant element of the final political goal on the Israeli side is the
expansion of settlements in the West Bank, Judea and Sumeria, and the removal of
Palestinians from these areas. Former Israeli Housing Minister, Uri Ariel, expressed his
Zionist plans for such a proliferation of settlements. Ariel is an Israeli orthodox Jew who
is a current member of the Knesset. He also serves a spot in The Jewish Home, which is a
radical right-wing Zionist political party in Israel. In an interview in The Middle East
Monitor in 2014, Ariel declared the goal to “Eradicate remaining slivers of Palestinian
territory”. He continued to say that, “There will be just one state between the Jordan
River and the sea, and that is the State of Israel”. Ariel further asserted that there will be
no more freezing of construction and no more delays, “Not in Jerusalem and not in Judea
and Sumeria”. Ariel declared the entire annexation of the West Bank as his way of
conforming to early Zionist plans for the complete colonization of the region (Wadi,
2014).
Arial finished his statement by expressing that Palestinians will be granted Israeli
citizenship after five years. But only after Palestinians complete a Hebrew language test
and also sign a statement of loyalty to the Jewish State. If Palestinians complete all these
tasks, he explained, they will be granted the right to vote, but not on a national level.
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In light of the above, the vision of religious nationalists on the Israeli side is the
establishment of “Greater Israel” as a Jewish state that appropriates Palestinian territories.

4.3.4 How Religious Nationalists Saw Donald Trump
Religious nationalism on the Israeli side was also reflected in how certain Zionists
responded to the 2016 election of Donald Trump as president of the United States.
Religious nationalists saw the election of Donald Trump as an answerer many prayers. In
their eyes, as well as in the eyes of secular right-wing nationalists, Trump’s success in the
U.S. elections gave a green light to build more settlements in the West Bank, in line with
Israel’s plan of achieving a “Greater Israel”. As stated by the Times of Israel, the day
after Donald Trump’s victory in the American presidential election, the leader of the
Israeli branch of the Republican Party, Marc Zell, visited the Western Wall in
Jerusalem’s Old City to thank God for Trump’s win. Wearing suit and tie and a white
“Make America Great Again” baseball cap, the co-chair of Republicans Overseas Israel
danced with ultra-Orthodox worshipers and recited verses of thanksgiving from The Old
Testament (“At Western Wall” 2016).
Zell also wrote a note, containing a wish, and placed it into the ancient stones of
the wall and told reporters, “I came here simply because I wanted to express my feeling
of gratitude to the Holy One, blessed be He, for what He gave us, for what He gave
Donald Trump and (American vice-president-elect) Mike Pence and the entire team, also
in Israel and across the world.” “I am in the clouds, really,” Zell said, visibly moved at
Trump’s surprising victory. He also stated, “I believed it would happen, but when it
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actually came true, I didn’t understand what’s going on here. It’s something supernatural”
(“At Western Wall”, 2016).
Furthermore, an article from the Huffington Post states that, “Due to the
presidential election of the new American President, Donald Trump, Israeli settlers see
that as a message from God” (“In Donald Trump”, 2017). For many settlers, “The
election of President Trump was a kind of miracle,” said retired Israeli Brigadier General
Shlomo Brom, a former peace negotiator who now works at Israel’s Institute for National
Security Studies. Brom also stated that, “Everyone predicted that Clinton would be
elected, so for them this is something that was done by God, which means that God
supports them” (“In Donald Trump”, 2017).

34

Chapter 5:
Comparative Contrast in the Functions of Religion on the Respective Sides
The above analysis explicates the function of religion on the Palestinian side, as
well as on the Israeli side. It is now in order to compare and contrast the approach of each
side around the central themes that drove the aforementioned analysis, namely, the
religious perspective on a) territorial rights, b) the use of deadly force and violence, and
c) the final political goal. In light of the analysis presented in the previous sections, what
is striking is that while the representatives of the religious perspective on each side see
the other as the absolute enemy, they have very similar perspectives on the three themes
mentioned above.

5.1 Religious Perspective on Territorial Rights
Both religious nationalisms claim more or less the same territory with the Israeli
side claiming the land from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, and the
Palestinian side claiming all the land that used to be Palestine prior to the establishment
of Israel. Both sides adopt an exclusivist view of territory that in principle territory can
never be shared with the other side or any other group. The two sides are also similar in
their view that God gave them the land as an eternal inheritance that can neither be shared
nor negotiated with anyone. The religious perspective on each side is also similar in that
it is premised on the assumption that negotiating the land is tantamount to disobeying
God and violating His will.
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5.2 Religious Perspective on the Use of Deadly Force and Violence
On the Israeli side, religious nationalists are willing to kill and be killed for the
sake of sustaining their God-given patrimony, and on the Palestinian side, raising Jihad in
the presence of the enemy is their religious duty. The religious nationalist perspective of
each mirrors that of the other, in that religion, having been integrated into nationalism
and national identity, legitimizes the use of force and violence. More specifically, each
side views the conflict as one between good and evil, where God is on the side of one’s
own nation. By adding the religious dimension to the nationalist narrative, religious
nationalists on each side intensify the hardline approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.

5.3 Religious Perspective on the Final Political Goal
On the Israeli side, maintaining and expanding the building settlements, is seen as
aligned with God’s creed. On the Palestinian side, their Islamic creed is seen as the sole
basis for liberating and establishing a Palestinian state. The end goal of religious
nationalists on the Israeli side is the establishment of “Greater Israel” that is distinctively
and exclusively Jewish. The end goal of religious nationalists on the Palestinian side is
the establishment of “Greater Palestine” that is distinctively and exclusively Muslim.
Based on the above comparisons, there is significant evidence that both the Israeli
and Palestinian religious nationalists have fundamental similarities. Both denounce the
other side completely, based on the presumption that their religiously prescribed nation is
eternal and decreed by God. decree is eternal. For both sides, negotiating what they view
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as the land of their nation-state is tantamount to breaking trust with their God, and if that
trust is broken, they will face the ultimate punishment. They both sides envision the
establishment of their territorially expanded nation-state, where respectively the Israeli
religious nationalists want a nation-state with an exclusive Jewish identity and the
Palestinian religious nationalists want a state with an exclusive Muslim identity. The end
goal of each side mirrors that of the other. As the two sides make maximalist claims on
the same territory, with concepts of nationhood that have exclusive religious identities,
establishing a Greater Jewish state and a Greater Muslim state, entail contradictory and
mutually exclusive end goals.
In identifying the above similarities, in the religious nationalism of each side, one
can see how the respective perspectives cannot possibly contribute to a negotiated peace.
They exclude each other in such an absolute way, that they end up being fundamentally
irreconcilable, which practically means, they cannot, by their very nature, negotiate
peace. Rather, they remain entrenched in conflict.
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Chapter 6: Alternative Approaches to the Role of Religion- Peace
Throughout this thesis, we have focused on the rise of religious nationalism and
how the role of religion functions as a catalyst to conflict. As previously mentioned,
Judaism and Islam as the two of the main monotheistic religions in the Israel-Palestine
region, argue that historically these religions also promote peace. The remainder of this
thesis will examine Israeli and Palestinian pro-peace leaders, and how differently they
approach religion in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to religious
nationalists.

6.1 On the Israeli Side
One of the most notable pro-peace leaders on the Israeli side is Dr. Alon GoshenGottstein, the director of the Elijah Institute in Jerusalem. His mission, is to create
understanding and harmony between the world’s religions. His institute does this through
interfaith dialogue, education, research and dissemination between the world’s diverse
faith communities. The Elijah Institute’s unique programming generates interfaith
dialogue at the highest levels, bringing together religious leaders and renowned scholars
from around the globe, through research projects, public conferences, community-based
initiatives, and prayer.
Dr. Goshen-Gottstein has a vision of a center called the House of Vision and
Hope (H.O.P.E.), that he claims is inspired by the prophecy of God’s house being a house
of prayer for all people. He expresses his vision by noting that:
There is not a single institution in all of Jerusalem in which its religions
share and come together. There is no interreligious center anywhere in the
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Holy Land that is frequented by members of the three religions and there
is absolutely no sense of the possibility of sharing a site or a place of
worship, as a means of seeking to express and deepen the quest for peace
and harmony between Jerusalem’s religions. In fact, there is no such
center anywhere in the world. Once such a center is created, it would
provide a powerful symbol of the potential that Jerusalem has to be a city
of peace, rather than one of tension (“Elijah Interfaith, n.d.).
In addition to Jewish leaders in the region, there are Jewish leaders among the
American Jewish community who articulate a pro-peace approach to religion. One of
most prominent is Rabbis Michael Lerner (2014), a pro-peace activist, and one who lives
in the United States, but makes frequent visits to Israel. He asserts that today religious
traditions and different versions of Judaism entail models and archetypes for the
significance of peace, but criticizes that religious nationalist approaches are not aligned
with Judaism. He is critical and disapproves of religions when they vilify the other. In
contrast to the latter approach, his alternative approach to religion is one that prioritizes
the promotion of peace and the positive change peace movements aspire to achieve.
But Lerner also has some criticism of peace movements. He notes that peace
movements are often known as focusing on what they are against. From his religious
perspective, Lerner asks the question as to why people, who are involved in peace studies
and peace movements, do not give greater political support to social movements and
political movements that unequivocally support peace. He continues to say that part of
the answer has to do with the failures of peace movements and peace and conflict studies,
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focusing on what they are against. Instead, he asserts, peace movements need to promote
peace and educate others to promote a vision of a world based on peace.
Lerner (2014) also promotes the concept of Jewish Renewal, a small Jewish
movement which he describes as "positive Judaism", rejecting what he considers to be
ethnocentric interpretations of the Torah. His publications promote religious pluralism
and progressive or liberal approaches to political problems. Lerner is also a critic of what
he calls the “Israel can-do-no-wrong voices in American politics”. He explained that this
mentality, which frequently leads to accusations that Jews who oppose Israel’s policies
toward the Palestinians are “self-hating Jews”, alienates young Jews who “say that they
can no longer identify with their Jewishness” (Lerner, 2007).
At an interfaith gathering in Spain, Jewish, Muslim and Christian clergy came
together to denounce violence and vow to promote a life of mutual respect. Organizers of
the gathering said in a statement that while some participants were “considered
extremists,” the clergy recognized the “special responsibility to contribute to the desired
peace”. For example, current Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, David Lau (2016) was
recently quoted at the gathering saying that:
The violence that is conducted, supposedly in the name of God, is a
desecration of His name, a crime against those who are created in His
image, and a debasement of faith. The proper means of solving conflict
and disagreement is by negotiation and deliberation only (Staff, 2016).
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6.2 On the Palestinian Side
Religious pro-peace leaders on the Palestinian side have also been forthcoming in
recent years expressing their views on the Israel-Palestine conflict. An example of this
would be Hamas-linked Sheikh Imad Al-Falouji, one of the founders of an armed wing of
Hamas who now serves as the chairman of the Adam Center for Dialogue of Civilizations
in Gaza. Having moved beyond his militant past, he stated that, “We vehemently call for
the cessation of incitement, misrepresentation and distortion of the image of the other and
of the neighbor”. Al-Falouji and Rabbi Lau were both seen at the same interfaith summit
in Spain, declaring and advocating a non-violent solution to the conflict. Both expressed
their recognition of the “right of the two peoples to exist with dignity”, and urged Israeli
and Palestinian leaders to come together and work towards that goal, also stating that,
“We commit ourselves to educate future generations to uphold mutual respect” (Staff,
2016).
Another religious pro-peace leader is Abdul Hadi Palazzi. He is the Secretary
General of the Italian Muslim Assembly but also a co-founder of the Islam-Israel
Fellowship. The fellowship promotes a positive Muslim attitude towards Jews and Israel
based on what Palazzi believes are the authentic teachings of Muhammad as expressed in
the Qur'an and the Hadith. He accepts Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem, if the rights of
other religions are protected. He quotes the Qur'an to support Judaism's special
connection to the Temple Mount. According to Palazzi (2001), Jerusalem is also sacred
to Muslims because of its prior holiness to Jews and its standing as home to the biblical
prophets and kings David and Solomon, all of whom, he says, are sacred figures also in
Islam. He claims that the Qur'an "expressly recognizes that Jerusalem plays the same role
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for Jews that Mecca has for Muslims." When asked what the Qur'an says about the State
of Israel, Palazzi replied:
The Qur'an cannot deal with the State of Israel as we know it today, since
that State came into existence in 1948 only, i.e., many centuries after the
Qur'an itself was revealed. However, the Qur'an specifies that the Land of
Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, that God Himself gave that
Land to them as heritage and ordered them to live therein. It also
announces that—before the end of the time—the Jewish people will come
from many different countries to retake possession of that heritage of
theirs. Whoever denies this actually denies the Qur'an itself. If he is not a
scholar, and in good faith believes what other people say about this issue,
he is an ignorant Muslim. If, on the contrary, he is informed about what
the Qur'an says and openly opposes it, he ceases to be a Muslim (2010).
Another religious pro-peace leader who asserts that the return of the Jews to the Holy
Land, and the establishment of Israel, are in accordance with teachings of Islam, is
Sheikh Muhammad al-Hussaini. Al- Hussaini is a British Muslim scholar who
understands the texts of the Qur’an and asserts that Muslims can be convinced of his
interpretation. He claims that until now there has been no respectable dialogue regarding
these founding texts but dialogue is possible. He continues saying that:
First, by recognizing that the Qur'an does, in fact, confirm the Biblical
promise, then by re-reading commentaries on the Qur'anic text where
the Jewish claim is strengthened. Beyond that, although the Jews
come in for severe criticism in the works of Muslim apologists and

42

theologians, there are no grounds in religious law to entertain the
conceit that God's promise to the Children of Israel has been broken,
and none to support the view that Israel is now the property of the
Muslims. This effort involves an approach to the analysis of texts that
requires Muslim scholars to take lessons from modern Biblical
interpretation as practiced by Christian and Jewish interpreters of
scripture working singly and together (2009).

6.3 How do they Define Religion Differently
Pro-peace religious leaders previously mentioned that address the IsraelPalestine conflict view their religion in a way that counters that of religious
nationalists in significant ways. Pro-peace leaders hold themselves and the view of
their nation at a value no less than any other religion or nation. Moreover, they view
the right to exist and the value of human life as higher than anything else. These
leaders define their religion as contributing to peace, negotiation and deliberation, to
exist with dignity, and mutual respect. Most importantly, they view violence against
one’s fellow man as a violation of God’s creed, and they view war as the ultimate sin.
In addition, these religious voices that are among these pro-peace Jews and Muslims
also identify with what has been called the Abrahamic religions.

6.4 Abrahamic Religions
It is important to note that these pro-peace monotheistic religions of Islam,
Judaism and Christianity in the Israel-Palestine region are also referred to as the
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Abrahamic religions and as Abrahamism. They represent a group of Semiticoriginated sects that claim descent from the practices of the ancient Hebrews. They
view themselves as descendants of the worship of the God of Abraham. The major
Abrahamic religions in chronological order of founding are:
● Judaism (seventh century BCE)
● Christianity (first century CE)
● Islam (seventh century CE)
According to the history of Abrahamic religions, Judaism began as a local tribal

cult, and then the Abrahamists were able to spread globally through Christianity being
adopted by the Roman Empire in the 4th century and through the military campaigns of
the Arabs who spread Islam from the 7th century onward. As a consequence, today the
Abrahamic religions are one of the major categories in comparative religion (along with
Indian, Iranian, and East Asian religions). Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are the largest
Abrahamic religions in terms of numbers of adherents (Derrida, 2002).
The Abrahamic religions, have common roots in Abraham, who is an essential
figure in the Bible, the Torah and the Qur’an. This conclusion also validates the
previously mentioned Sheikh Muhammad Al-Hussaini, his claim that, Jewish claims to
their Holy Land rest in passages of the Torah and the Qur’an, meaning that Judaism

and Islam come from one spiritual source. This means that if Judaism and Islam derive
from a single source, then they derive from a similar ancestry. Thus, since they derive
from the same ancestry, then they affirm one eternal God who created the universe,
whose grace is bestowed equally on all people.
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Chapter 7:
Concluding Remarks and the Way Forward: Recommended Directives for Conflict
Resolution
In light of the above analysis, we can now revert back to the problem statement
that drove the research of the present thesis, in order to summarize and conclude on our
findings. Given the ambiguous role that religion has played in peace and conflict
phenomena, our inquiry attempted to explore the conditions under which religion
becomes a catalyst for conflict, including lethal conflict, and the conditions under which
religion may become a catalyst for sustainable peace. The inquiry was pursued in the
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by examining the various narratives informed
by religion and how they function in relation to the conflict.
What transpired from the analysis was that on both the Israeli and the Palestinian
sides one finds two contrasting approached to religion in relation to the conflict. On the
one hand, Hamas among the Palestinians and religious Zionists and Orthodox Jews
among the Israelis reflect narratives of religious nationalism, characterized by an
absolutist and adversarial approach to the other, in ways that lead to deadlock and
impasse, as well as to intensification and hardening of the conflict. On the other hand,
particular religious leaders among Israeli Jews and religious leaders among Palestinian
Muslims reflect what may be called post-nationalist approaches to religion, characterized
by prioritizing peace, reconciliation and mutually respectful coexistence between Israelis
and Palestinians.
To summarize: Israeli and Palestinian religious nationalists accept the absolutism
of their nation-state and the exclusivity of its ethnic and religious identity. Israeli and
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Palestinian religious post-nationalists reject the absolutist view of the nation-state and the
exclusivity of the nation’s ethnic and religious identity, opting instead for a more open
and flexible approach to the nation-state on the basis of accepting the equality and
diversity of identities. Religious nationalists among Israelis and Palestinians approach the
issue of the land in a maximalist and exclusive way, claiming that God gave them the
land as an eternal inheritance—a position that makes it impossible to address the issue of
territory in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In contrast, religious post-nationalists reject this approach as antithetical to their
creed. Instead they support negotiations and diplomacy in a spirit of reconciliation as the
way to address territorial rights. Whereas both Israeli and Palestinian religious
nationalists view the conflict as one of good versus evil, with God on their side, religious
post-nationalists view the conflict as destructive and evil and God on the side of peace.
Religious nationalists view war and violence as a religiously and morally legitimate
means of pursing national objectives, whereas religious post-nationalists reject war and
violence, as they view war and violence to be contrary to their religious creed. Religious
post-nationalists believe that peaceful means of addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
such as dialogue, negotiations and diplomacy, are more aligned with their religious creed
and constitute the pathway to peace and security.
Following the examination of the various narratives that have a bearing of the role
of religion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the above summary, crystalizes the
approaches to religion that differentiate the conditions under which religion functions as a
catalyst for conflict from the conditions under which religion functions as a catalyst for
peace in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The question that naturally follows
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from this conclusion is, what is the recommended way forward in regard to the function
of religion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
The landscape of how religion functions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
disclosed contradictory approaches in regard to the national issues and goals as viewed
by each side. In light of the findings, certain directives can be recommended that may
constructively assist and support conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.
The first directive is to pursue an increase in engagement between religious
nationalists and pro-peace, religious post-nationalist within Judaism. The same is
recommended among Muslims in the Palestinian community. The first recommendation
is therefore the initiation and intensification of intra-religious dialogue within the Israeli
community and the Palestinian community respectively. Building on the first
recommendation, the second directive is to pursue engagement in inter-religious dialogue
between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Numerous scholars have also given support for the abovementioned directives.
For example, Scholar Susan Hayward (2010) suggests that it can beneficial to conduct
separate intra-religious preparatory sessions with each religious community prior to the
inter-religious dialogue. Hayward continues by saying that having dialogue within their
religion, allows participants from each group to explore the topic that would be
discussed, in order to familiarize themselves with it, to establish points of agreement and
disagreement inside their own group, and further, to explore concerns or hopes regarding
the interfaith encounter (p. 28).
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In conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these intra-religious
encounters, can be just as important, if not more important, as inter-religious encounters.
Scholar Marc Gopin (2010) was a participant in conflict resolution processes in the
Israel-Palestine region that included religious leaders from all sides of the conflict. He
claims that in the face of extraordinary suffering and insecurity, many individuals use
their beliefs, values, stories and sentiment to understand their situation. He argues that a
peaceful religion is one that sustains a solid sense of identity alongside and with respect
for other traditions. As such, the element of peacebuilding through religion, should entail
finding the resources within each religion to promote this form of identity, as opposed to
an exclusivist and violent religious identity. Peace-makers should then consider
immersing themselves in the traditions and world views of those in conflict, in order to
explore how to engage and encourage more positive interpretations (p.25).
Religious leaders, with their teachings, values and institutions can work as
community members on interpreting their political and social realities in part or in whole
through a religious lens, to promote social behavior and attitudes as a way of speaking in
their own interpretive language to their community members. This is where interfaith
dialogue can be used for peace and justice-making. As a result of this work, especially in
times when political, social or economic tensions arise, these kinds of dialogue allow for
conflicts to be addressed, along with misunderstanding being corrected and solutions
negotiated, even before large-scale violence breaks out (Hayward, 2010).
For example, in 2009, former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Bondevik spoke at
a meeting of the Common Word Initiative, a global Muslim-Christian dialogue project.
At this meeting, Bendevik recounted how the cartoons published in Denmark in 2005
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caused outrage among Muslim communities. The cartoons were similarly published in
Norway. In Norway, however, there had been sustained interfaith dialogue in the years
preceding. Bondevik reflected that, when the cartoons were published, Christian, Muslim
and other religious and political leaders instantaneously came together, and reacted to the
emerging crisis in unison. Bondevik argued that this may have been part of the reason
why in Norway, the controversy did not erupt to the crisis level that it did in Denmark.
He finished by saying that since in Denmark there was less history of interfaith dialogue,
there were fewer avenues for resolution, and less trust between, leaders from the
communities to address the crisis promptly before it escalated (Hayward, 2010).
All of the world’s religions have sought to introduce practices and values that can
reduce negative social and political dynamics, much like the conflict in Israel and
Palestine. One of the essential practices that is affirmed in the teachings of many
religions, is compassionate engagement with those of other communities. Interfaith
dialogue on its own cannot end conflict and create justice around the world. However, it
is a powerful tool for relationship building to amplify sustainable activism and
sustainable relationships across the ethno-religious divides, including the Israeli-Palestine
divide.

49

References

A. (2017, February 23). Israel’s education minister on Al Jazeera cites the Bible as the
Jewish claim to the Occupied Territories. Retrieved April 05, 2017, from
http://pr.aljazeera.com/post/157603426520/israels-education-minister-on-al-jazeera-cites
Ahren, R., Agencies and Times of Israel staff, Pileggi, T., Hussein, S., Winer, S., Zion, I.
B., . . . Magid, J. (2016, November 09). At Western Wall, head of Israeli GOP thanks
God for Trump win. Retrieved from http://www.timesofisrael.com/at-western-wall-headof-israeli-gop-thanks-god-for-trump-win/
Alter, P. (1994). Nationalism (2nd ed.). London: Hodder Arnold.
Anastasiou, H. (2008). “Encountering Nationalism: The Contribution of Peace Studies
and Conflict Resolution.” In Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste,
Jessica Senehi (Eds.) Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. New York:
Routledge.
Anastasiou, H. (2009). Encountering Nationalism: The Contribution of Peace Studies
and Conflict Resolution. In Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (pp. 32-44).
Routledge. doi:https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203893166.ch2
Anastasiou, H. (with Broome, B. J.) (2010). “Nationalism.” In Ronald L. Jackson II (Ed.)
Encyclopedia of Identity. Volumes I & II. Sage.
Anastasiou, H. (2014). Eastern Orthodox Christianity. In Peace on Earth (pp. 243-262).
Langham, MD, Lexington.
Anderson, B. (1995). Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso.
Auerbach, Y. (2010). National narratives in a conflict of identity. Barriers to peace in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 99-134.
Berman, S.J. (2001, February 1). The Ideology of Modern Orthodoxy | Sh’ma
Journal. Retrieved January, 2016, from http://shma.com/2001/02/theideology-of-modern-orthodoxy/
Derrida, Jacques (2002). Anidjar, Gil, ed. Acts of Religion. New York & London:
Routledge.ISBN 978-0-415-92401-6.
50

Drory, Z. (n.d.). The‘Religionizing’of the Israel Defense Force: Its Impact on Military
Culture and Professionalism. Retrieved from
http://resmilitaris.net/ressources/10195/70/res_militaris_article_drory_the_religionizing_
of_the_idf.pdf

Elijah Interfaith – Sharing Wisdom Fostering Peace. (n.d.). Retrieved May 20,
2017, from http://elijah-interfaith.org/

Encyclopedia Judaica: Volume 8, p. 145
Norton, A. R. (2014). Hezbollah: a short history. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Gopin, Marc. “Engaging across Divides: Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and
Justice.” (2010): 21-29. State of the World’s Minorities. Web.
<http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download
843-Engaging-across-divides-interfaith-dialogue-for-peace-and-justice.pdf>.
Hamas Covenant 1988. (2008). Retrieved from
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp
Hayward, Susan. “Engaging across Divides: Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and Justice.”
(2010): 21-29. State of the World’s Minorities. Web. <http://minorityrights.org/wpcontent/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-843-Engaging-across-divides-interfaithdialogue-for-peace-and-justice.pdf>.
Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
John Stoessinger. 1962. The Might of Nations. New York: Random House.
Juergensmeyer, M. (1996). The worldwide rise of religious nationalism. Journal of
International Affairs, 1-20.
Lerner, M. (2007, February 07). There Is No New Anti-Semitism. Retrieved May 14,
2017, from http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/020207LERNER.shtml

51

Lerner, Michael (2014). Judaism and the Path to Peace. In Peace on Earth (pp.
105-120). Langham, MD, Lexington.
Mkwords.com. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://mkwords.com/text/?i=86&a=Palestine
'Mothers of all Palestinians should also be killed,' says Israeli politician. (2015, May 12).
Retrieved from https://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2014/07/14/mothers-of-allpalestinians-should-also-be-killed-says-israeli-politician
"Muhammad Al-Hussaini. The Qur'an's Covenant with the Jewish People". Middle East
Quarterly. Fall 2009, pp. 9–14. 2009-03-19. Retrieved 2010-04-13.
Original Party. (n.d.). In Jewish Virtual Library. Retrieved from
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/original-party-platform-of-the-likud-party
Palazzi, Imam. (2010). Dollars for Terror: The United States and Islam. Algora
Publishing. "Land of Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people—Imam Palazzi".
Weekly Blitz. Volume #5, Issue #42, October 13, 2010
Ranstorp, M. (1996). Terrorism in the Name of Religion. Journal of International Affairs,
41-62.
Rotberg, R. I. (2007). Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: history's double
helix. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press.
Rothman, J. (1997). Resolving Identity-Based Conflict In Nations, Organizations, and
Communities. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers.
Schwartz, Y. (2017, March 29). In Donald Trump, Israeli Settlers See A Message From
God. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-israelsettlers_us_58d94a66e4b03787d35aceec
Shimoni, G. (1995). The Zionist Ideology (Vol. 21). Brandeis University Press.
Staff, T. O. (2016, November 19). Hamas-linked imam, Israel chief rabbi unite in call for
peace. Retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-linked-imamisrael-chief-rabbi-unite-in-call-for-peace/
Wadi, R. (2014, May 30). Israeli Housing Minister Uri Ariel advocates for the complete
52
colonisation of Palestine. Retrieved May 13, 2017, from

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140530-israeli-housing-minister-uri-arieladvocates-for-the-complete-colonisation-of-palestine/
What is Hamas? (2012, November 20). Retrieved February 01, 2017, from
https://palestineisraelconflict.wordpress.com/what-is-hamas/
Yahya, H. (1994). Allahs beautiful promises to believers necessitate that they remain
hopeful. Retrieved April 02, 2017, from http://www.harunyahya.com/en/DailyComments/12690/allahs-beautiful-promises-to-believers

53

